LATE MAKING OF CLAIMS UNDER THE MOTOR ACCIDENTS COMPENSATION ACT (1999):
REQUIREMENT FOR A “SATISFACTORY” EXPLANATION
You should refer to our earlier article in relation to the making of late motor accident claims. This paper
adds to the topic in relation to the need for an explanation not only to be full, but also to be satisfactory.
The High Court considered the meaning of satisfactory delay in Russo v Aiello  215 CLR. At 463, Gleeson CJ said:
“What would justify a reasonable person in a position of the claimant ‘experiencing’ a delay? It is impossible to give an exhaustive list of possible justifications. Delay in the onset of symptoms is one example; and as an example of some relevance to this case. It is to be noted that what the Act requires is justification for the delay; not demonstration of the delay caused no harm….The focus of the statutory concept of a satisfactory explanation is upon justified delay, rather than excusing it.”
In Walker v Howard  NSWCA 408 the Court of Appeal (sitting as a bench of five) considered the case of the claimant who was suffering serious brain damage. They suggested the case gives useful guidance as to the attributes the claimant that ought be considered when applying the objective tests under s.66(2) of the Act, that is the “reasonable person in the position of the claimant” test.
Firstly, the Court said that the position of a claimant with a disability includes that disability:
“….that placement of a fictional person in that position could be seen as a means of stating that the Court can grant leave if it is reasonable to conclude that the delay was justifiable in the claimant’s position….The phrase ‘position of the claimant’ is not limited in terms of the personal or physical characteristics of the claimant. It connotes aspects of a place and circumstances relevant to the enquiry….. It can be acceptable that the process is artificial, but an objective standard is imposed and given subjective content by the factors that make up the ‘position of the claimant’….. to the extent that the test requires the subjection of the reasonable person in the position of the claimant to their circumstances in the full explanation and a “justification” of experiencing them, such a constraint demands normative evaluation”.
Young, JA noted that the attributes to be attributed to the hypothetical reasonable person in the position of the claimant includes the age, sex and capacity of the claimant as well as her or her cultural background.
In Figgliuzzi v Yonan  NSWCA 290 the Court considered the earlier but similar incantation of the satisfactory explanation provisions in the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1988 and held that that the explanation for the failure to lodge the claim within the time prescribed was not satisfactory because she had failed to obtain legal advice in a timely fashion. McColl, JA makes clear in Figgliuzzi at  FF, the Act is one of many statutory schemes whereby the legislature has fixed definite time limits for the prosecution of civil claims because, “the public interest requires that disputes be settled as quickly as possible.” (CF Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor  HCA 25; (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 553 per McHugh, J). Unlike other limitation provisions, however, those fixed by MA are not absolute. The various authorities Her Honour collects in that judgment clearly “….demonstrate that a legislative concern with a prompt notification and timeous resolution of claims for damages arising out of motor vehicle accidents” and “what would constitute justifiable delays to be considered in the light of these legislative purposes”. The majority held that determining whether a claimant has provided a satisfactory explanation involves a ‘normative judgment’. Arising from the accident, Ms Yonan had complimentary rights under the workers compensation and motor accident legislative regimes. Ms Yonan who was employed by the Legal Aid Commission as a clerk offered as her explanation a belief that having made a claim for workers compensation she was not then able to claim damages under the motor accident regime.
At  Tobias JA, said:
“Accordingly, the critical question concerns behaviour of a reasonable person in a position of the [claimant] who, having the knowledge to which I have referred above, and having formed a belief without the benefit of any legal advice that, although she had been injured in a motor vehicle accident due to the negligence of the appellant, because the accident had occurred on her way to work as a consequence whereof she became entitled to workers compensation, that fact alone disentitled her from claiming damages under the MA Act. Would that reasonable person in the respondent’s position and having formed the belief she did, have sought legal advice on the correctness of that belief either from one of the solicitors in the civil section of the Commission or from a solicitor in private practise or would she, like the respondent, have done nothing to ascertain whether her belief was right or wrong?”
Santow JA, did not accept the view of the majority that it was unreasonable for her not to have sought legal advice and to have relied upon her ‘bush’ legal analysis. In dissenting, Santo JA said at :
“For a person to have a civil claim under two regimes, namely workers compensation and under the Motor Accidents Act is far from self-evident in such circumstances; indeed it comes close to being counter-intuitive. Therefore she did not feel the need to verify her belief when that belief was ex-facie reasonable does not to my mind render that belief unreasonable. A reasonable person in [the claimant’s] circumstances might well consider that she did not want to expend money or time in legal costs in verifying a belief intrinsically irrational, that her own employer by its actions had implicitly confirmed. Her employer did so by requiring her to complete a workers compensation claim form. The Commission neither then, nor subsequently, informed her that she could or should bring a claim for damages under the Motor Accidents Act in circumstances where she was injured on the way to work. While [the claimant’s] ignorance of the law did not of itself excuse her from complying with the statutory time period,…..nonetheless, taking her circumstances properly into account, her account was capable of satisfying the statutory requirements for “a full and satisfactory explanation”. I would therefore have reached the same conclusion as the primary Judge in this matter, applying the reasonable person test.”
More recently, Colefax DCJ in the unreported decision of Annetts v Bone & Anor, 04 December 2014 made reference to the following normative considerations:
(a) The limited formal education of the plaintiff;
(b) The knowledge or belief of the plaintiff that his condition was caused by the collision;
(c) The fact that the plaintiff took little time off work because of the injury for the first ten years after the accident;
(d) That the plaintiff was not out of pocket in relation to expenses associated with treatment of his injury because of the payments of workers compensation;
(e) The plaintiff had a broad knowledge of a separate method of compensation for injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident other than workers compensation;
(f) The separate methods of compensation not only had time limits but also thresholds, thresholds which did not appear to have been exceeded until ten years after the accident;
(g) The separate method of compensation provided that if proceedings were commenced and lost an adverse costs order would be made and could be enforced against the plaintiff;
(h) Finally, a serious deterioration in the plaintiff’s condition ten years after the accident.
In Gedel v Tihic  NSWDC 87, Leavy DCJ, considered the explanation offered by a plaintiff who upon medical advice did not initially believe his injuries to be serious. His Honour said:
“A reasonable person in the circumstances of the plaintiff would have more likely put up with a measure of discomfort experienced by the plaintiff…. and would most likely to have continued to carry on with his work with an attitude of optimism whilst the injuries took time to resolve.”
And in relation to the delay following the plaintiff’s initial consultation with his solicitors:
“In that regard, he was also required to come to grips with flow-on effects of these matters concerning his employment and his financial obligations generally as well as very real and worrying concerns over his mortgage liabilities and commitments… It is therefore not surprising and entirely understandable, that the plaintiff became preoccupied with such matters, and as a result became to a degree un-focused and disorganised concerning his personal affairs.”
The reasonable person test involves a degree of objective analysis which may vary according to assumptions made about the person. Further, the position of the claimant is not limited to merely personal or physical characteristics, but has been said to involve both injuries suffered in the accident (including any disabilities suffered) and the circumstances relevant to the delay. The test in Walker is an objective test that is whether a reasonable person would have been justified in experiencing the delay and involves a normative evaluation of the claimant’s behaviour in this regard. What is required is justification of the delay, not demonstration that the delay caused no harm or prejudice to the insurer.
In Brierley v Ellis  NSWCA 230 (17 July 2014), the Court of Appeal held that where there was no objection made by the insurer to evidence being produced by way of statutory declaration, and no contradictory evidence is tendered, the evidence should be given no less weight than if the information contained had been provided by way of oral evidence.
Beilby Poulden Costello